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Abstract—We live in a digital era. Digital contents may be 
produced by digital equipments or by converting old analog 
recordings. With the rapid growth of digital contents, digital 
archiving technology is demanded. Different types of contents 
require different processing techniques. In this paper, we focus 
on digital audio contents. The related techniques, such as 
forensics, authentication, and error concealment, were studied. 
When converting audio tapes to digital files, sometimes a 
certain automatic error detection and concealment is needed.  
However, traditional audio tapes were recorded without any 
error recovery information. Based on the restriction, we 
proposed a scheme that incorporates the electrical network 
frequency (ENF) as a tool for detecting damaged audio 
segments. The goal is to help people identifying candidate 
concealment segments. When using in an archiving application, 
it reduces the manpower as well as increases the accuracy of 
the generated meta-data. 
Keywords-audio; forensics; ENF; electrical network 
frequency;  concealment; digital archive 
I. INTRODUCTION
With the maturity of digital technology, not only the 
digital contents are easily produced but also the digitization 
of traditional analog contents is demanded. In a typical 
digital archiving application, one of the important tasks is to 
digitize the old analog data. Sometimes it also requires that a 
given digital object is authenticated when archiving. In this 
paper, we focus on archiving audio data. 
Given an analog audio tape, there are several forensic 
methods to authenticate the data[1]. Some of the techniques 
are based on the signal characteristics[2], but they are not 
reliable. Some of the techniques are based on the signature of 
the recorder. However, recorder signatures are not available 
in digital recorders because there are no electromagnetic 
effects among the circuits and the recording media. In order 
to authenticate digitally recorded audio data, we have to use 
other signature sources, such as the microphones[3][4] and 
the electrical network frequency (ENF)[5][6]. 
Digitizing audio tapes is not difficult. In terms of general 
archiving concepts, any defects in the analog version should 
be digitally preserved as well because they are part of the 
history of the archived object. The procedure becomes 
complicated when we consider in terms of the database. A 
digital archive is different from analog archives in that we 
can extract the features (the so-called meta-data) from the 
contents and store them for content-based searching 
applications. If we allow defects in the digital object, they 
may interfere with the meta-data extraction and produce 
imprecise description of the content. This implies that we 
need two digitized versions of an analog object: one for 
archive and the other for feature-extraction. The version for 
feature extraction should be processed so that most of the 
errors are concealed. This may involve a lot of human 
interactions because we have to make sure that the processed 
version conforms to the original semantics. An alternative 
approach is to exclude the defected segments out of the 
feature extraction process. To identify the defected segments, 
human interactions and/or audio specific analysis are 
involved. In short, to generate sensible meta-data, we need 
audio concealment[7][8][9] and/or damaged audio segment 
detection techniques. Because we focus on analyzing 
abnormal audio segments, audio forensic tools and 
concealment techniques are useful for this purpose. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we describe 
the general audio forensics methods and the electrical 
network frequency criterion. In Sec. III, we describe the 
concepts and approaches of audio concealment. In Sec. IV, 
we propose a scheme which incorporates the ENF as a tool 
for detecting erroneous audio segments. Then, we conclude 
our design and the future work in Sec. V. 
II. AUDIO FORENSICS
In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts of audio 
authentication in Sec. II.A. Then, one of the useful tools to 
authenticate recorded audio data, called electrical network 
frequency (ENF) criterion, is described in Sec. II.B. 
A. Analysis of Audio Recordings 
Given a recorded audio tape for forensics, we may want 
to authenticate the people, the time, the location, etc in the 
recording scene. The analysis is based on that the audio tape 
is original or a trusted copy. To determine the originality of 
an audio tape, we could use the idiosyncrasies and 
characteristics of a recorder. An audio tape recorder leaves 
its signatures on the tape when a button (start, stop, or pause) 
is pressed. Many research works showed the effectiveness of 
the signature by analyzing the waveform spectral component, 
spectrograms, and magnetic patterns. 
The signature of a recorder is emitted from the recording 
and erasing heads as magnetic signals. The heads are 
physically wired (by electric circuits) to the power supply 
and the switches. When a button is switched, the electric 
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current in the circuits is changed abruptly. Because a 
recorder is a transformer between electric and magnetic 
signals, the abrupt change in electric current generates 
magnetic field change near the heads. Two recorders of the 
same design are expected to behave the same in the 
electromagnetic transitions. In addition, it is not possible to 
produce two exactly same components due to the 
manufacturing process. The errors in the electric components 
and the recording heads make it unlikely to produce two 
same recorders. Therefore, we can assume that each recorder 
generates its unique magnetic signatures. The tape is very 
close to the head by design. Therefore, it is inevitable to 
leave a trace of magnetic field change on the tape when we 
operate the recorder. In short, each recorder leaves its 
signatures on the tape. 
The signatures of a recorder are a substantial property of 
an analog audio recording device because we cannot 
suppress the electromagnetic effects. However, this property 
does not exist when we use a digital audio recorder. Without 
the assistance of recorder signatures, two recording devices 
are not distinguishable. This implies that recorders are 
unreliable for forensics, and we have to use another 
representative property as the “signature”. Moreover, 
digitized audio data are usually compressed. Most of the 
popular audio compression algorithms are based on 
psychoacoustic models and perform the lossy (quantization) 
computations. If the forensic criterion is not salient enough, 
the compression would diminish the property to a useless 
level. 
There are several alternative forensic criteria, such as the 
microphone characteristics and the electrical network 
frequency (ENF). In the former approach, we shift the 
signature from the electromagnetic components to the 
microphone; and in the latter one, we shift the signature to 
outside of the recording device. In the following section, we 
will introduce the ENF criterion. 
B. The ENF and Digital audio Recordings 
A power plant generates electricity with the designated 
utility frequency. Different regions may use different utility 
frequencies. For example, the utility frequency is 60Hz in 
Taiwan and all the AC-powered electric equipments should 
be compliant to this specification. The transmission of 
electricity from the power plants to the end-users is typically 
organized as a number of grids. In a grid, the power cables 
are directly connected. This implies that any variation in the 
utility frequency in a grid is almost the same. 
The electricity is generated by mechanical devices in a 
power plant. The variations in heat source, pressure, and the 
rotation speed of the coils affect the generated frequency and 
current. To provide almost-constant electric frequency to the 
users, a power plant has to monitor and regulate the 
generated frequency. For example, we have to increase the 
heat when the frequency is decreasing, and vice versa. Since 
all the control processes are based on mechanical operations, 
the adaptation delay is inevitable. This induces the time-
varying, slowly and slightly deviation around the specified 
utility frequency. This variation is then distributed by the 
electrical grids. Sometimes we call the distributed time-
varying electrical frequency the electrical network frequency 
(ENF). 
When electronic equipment is used to record audio data, 
it captures not only the sound but also the implicit electric 
characteristics in the device. For an AC-powered recording 
device (assume that it is not professional-grade), the ENF is 
also recorded due to the coupling of the powering circuit and 
the capturing circuit. In some audio forensic researches, the 
ENF is used as a criterion. There are several reasons that the 
ENF is suitable for forensics: 
• The ENF is distributed only in the connected grids. 
This property can be used to localize the location of 
the recording device. 
• The ENF is time-varying. This property can be used 
to localize the time duration of the recorded audio 
clip. 
• The ENF is generated by the power plants. They can 
be the trusted sources to provide the ENF histories. 
This makes matching the ENF in a given audio clip 
meaningful. 
• Even without the trusted ENF history for matching, 
the phase continuity of the ENF in the given audio 
clip can be used to detect whether the clip is 
manipulated. 
According to the above characteristics, the typical usage 
is to match the extracted ENF components with the trusted 
ENF components. If they are not matched, either the 
time/location is wrong or the given audio clip is tampered. 
The trusted ENF source could be from the power plant or 
from an authenticated audio clip. The restriction to apply the 
ENF techniques is that the recording device should be AC-
powered. Otherwise, there is no ENF in the recorded data. 
III. AUDIO CONCEALMENT
Converting traditional analog audio tapes to digital form 
is one of the important steps in a digital archiving application. 
Strictly speaking, any damage is part of the archived object 
and should also be preserved. However, there are cases that 
we want to conceal the damage from the original version. 
For instance, we may want to detect the damaged (or tapped) 
duration in an audio clip and exclude it from the meta-data 
extraction process as described in Sec. I. We may further 
conceal the damaged data so that nonprofessional people do 
not experience the noisy or weird sound. In this section, we 
will briefly describe the approaches of audio concealment. 
Figure 1. Sender-based audio concealment[7] 
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A. Sender-based Approach 
Sender-based approach requires the involvement of the 
audio sources. There are two sub-categories: active and 
passive approaches (Fig. 1). An active method is used in a 
networked delivery environment. Damages or losses can be 
detected by the network management or the receiver. Once 
the sender is notified, it retransmits the data for concealment. 
This approach is able to precisely conceal the errors with the 
cost of retransmission delay. The delays are affordable 
because most of the players are designed to buffer a certain 
amount of data before decoding. Therefore it is a practical 
solution for audio streaming applications. 
A passive method does not require a real-time 
networking infrastructure. Instead of retransmitting 
concealment data when necessary, the sender always 
transmits additional information along with the media data. 
Once the receiver detects an error, it conceals the error by the 
additional information. One of the examples is to insert the 
forward error correction (FEC) code to the audio stream. The 
receiver can recover the erroneous data to the original 
version, as long as the number of errors is within the 
designed tolerance. 
If the audio data is treated as an ordinary bit stream, 
conventional channel coding techniques can be adopted as 
the FEC code. This is called the media-independent approach. 
If we take the media coding scheme into consideration, we 
may design a specific coding structure so that multiple 
correlated streams are transmitted. The more the correct 
streams are obtained by the receiver, the more precise the 
reconstructed data is produced. This is called the media-
specific approach. Some of the techniques are general, such 
as the interleaving method. It is a general technique in 
communication systems to reduce the impact of burst errors. 
When transmitting, the data packets are interleaved to avoid 
burst errors in the received stream. The costs are the enlarged 
receiver buffer and the increased decoding delay. 
B. Receiver-based Approach 
Without the assistance of the sender, the receiver is not 
able to recover the data precisely. The receiver can only try it 
best to conceal the errors, in a sense of human perceptions. 
These methods only require the receiver to participate in the 
error concealment process and thus called receiver-based 
approaches. Of course, it is very difficult to conceal the 
errors and retain the semantic correctness without ambiguity. 
Therefore, most of the concealment methods are designed to 
work with sound quality (e.g., psychoacoustic models). The 
semantic correctness of the recovered data is assumed to be 
checked manually.  
As shown in Fig. 2, receiver-based methods are based on 
insertion, interpolation, and regeneration of data. Researches 
show that human psychoacoustic model is quite different 
from the human visual model. For audio signals, the masking 
effect, the noise tolerance, and the automatic concealment 
are important to the computer-based concealment algorithms. 
Because human can automatically conceal short-duration 
noise and discontinuity (i.e., human are not sensitive to 
short-duration errors), the computer-based concealment does 
not have to be perfect. The insertion-based methods are 
based on simple splicing, noise substitution, or even 
repetition of adjacent audio data. 
Interpolation-based concealment methods are based on 
the assumption that the waveforms can be predicted. It is 
also known that audio signals are somewhat self-similar. 
Based on the two properties, concealment algorithms detect 
the pitches and the waveforms, and then try to interpolate the 
existent (correct) data to replace the damaged segments. In 
general, the interpolation-based approach is better than the 
insertion-based. It not only relies on human neurons to 
compensate the recover error but also predicts the probable 
waveform according to the nature of audio signals. 
The most complicated among the three is the 
regeneration-based approach. It requires sophisticated 
analysis so that the coding states and/or the audio models are 
well estimated. After having a good model for the audio 
segment, we can regenerate data to replace the damaged part. 
The regeneration rule is to make the generated data conform 
to all the properties of the estimated audio segment. This 
approach usually requires a lot of computation to estimate 
the model. The advantage is the higher quality of the 
regenerated audio data. On the contrary, if the estimation 
Figure 2. Receiver-based audio concealment[7] 
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procedure somehow fails, the quality of the regeneration 
would be worse than the former two approaches. 
IV. DETECTING DAMAGED AUDIO CLIPS
In the above audio concealment approaches, sender-
based methods are not suitable for digital audio archiving 
applications. The reason is that traditional analog recording 
devices are not equipped with error correction mechanisms. 
Since the senders (original audio sources) are not available 
today, the receiver-based techniques are suitable for digital 
archiving applications. 
Many receiver-based concealment techniques can also be 
used for analyzing audio properties. However, there are not 
many error detection methods for raw audio data (due to the 
semantic issues). It thus costs a lot of manpower to identify 
the damaged audio segments in a large collection of tapes. 
Although automatically detection is not likely to work 
perfectly, a program that analyzes the data and suggests the 
possible erroneous segments is useful for decreasing costs. 
Fig. 3 shows our proposed scheme for detecting damaged 
audio data. For an input audio stream, we analyze it and 
estimate the parameters based on the audio models. During 
this process, some generic signal processing tools may be 
used. The feature of this scheme is that we incorporate the 
forensics-based techniques as the detection tools. Currently 
we concentrate on the use of the ENF criterion because a 
large portion of the traditional recordings are AC-powered. 
The detection accuracy could be increased by taking the ENF 
properties into consideration: 
• Divide the raw audio stream into a sequence of 
packets (may be overlapped). 
• Use a band-pass filter to extract the spectrum around 
the utility frequency. 
• We assume that the ENF is a slow-varying function 
of time. If an abrupt frequency change is detected, it 
is possible that the packet contains a discontinuity of 
the audio data. This implies that it is an intended 
recording operation, a manipulation, or a damaged 
duration. 
• The marked packets represent the set of candidate 
inconsistent durations. They can be part of the 
information for deciding errors. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we discussed the analysis of audio 
recordings and one of the audio forensic methods called the 
electrical network frequency (ENF) criterion. For digital 
audio recordings, the electromagnetic signatures of a 
recorder are not available. If the recording device is AC-
powered, no matter it is an analog device or a digital device, 
the ENF is usually coupled into the recorded data via the 
circuits. Therefore, matching the ENF history and localizing 
the location/time of the recording is feasible. 
We also discussed a few audio concealment techniques, 
and related them to the digital archiving applications. Our 
conclusion is that receiver-based methods are suitable for 
this purpose. To reduce the manpower in identifying the 
damaged audio segments, we proposed that incorporating the 
ENF as a detection tool in the process. Instead of being used 
as a matching criterion, the ENF is used to detect 
discontinuities of a given audio clip. It is based on the 
assumption that the ENF is a slow-varying function of time. 
Currently we have not found a similar idea in the 
literature. In the future, we would like to verify the 
effectiveness of the ENF-based tool. After the verification, 
we will refine the scheme so that the ENF-based detection 
results are formulated to increase the detection accuracy. 
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